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In his recent paper, Young has eloquently put forward a novel account of how and why the 
phenomenon of thought insertion (TI) seen in patients with schizophrenia does not contradict 
the immunity principle (i.e. first-person access to one’s own thoughts and psychological 
states is ‘immunity to error through misidentification’). He argues that in TI, the problem lies 
not in misidentification but in mispredication: the individual with TI does not ascribe the 
right predicate to the wrong subject but has misdetected the predicate in the first place. The 
author points out that an inconsistently formulated immunity principle could risk confusing 
the two types of errors. The author defines the immunity principle as 
        Any agent who thinks a thought* (the asterisk indicates thoughts obtained by privileged 
access) of the form ‘I am F’ cannot be right on the basis of the perspective grounding this 
thought that something is F but wrong about whether ‘I am F’. 
        Given this definition, it would indeed be the case that if one claims they have thoughts 
that are not theirs, it is the predicate and not the initiator of the thoughts that is susceptible to 
error. Note that the author stresses ‘any formulation of the immunity principle be limited to 
present-tense self-referential judgements [my emphasis]’ ascribing a predicate to the essential 
indexical ‘I’, and any over-simplification would only create the illusion that TI breaches the 
immunity principle. 
        However, perhaps another possibility for this confusion is the inconsistency in defining 
TI itself. The author of the current paper makes a specific point that in TI, the patients do not 
only claim the thoughts are not generated by themselves but actually belong to another agent. 
This, of course, would seem implausible (whether considered from the immunity principle or 
not) if not utterly false even to a lay person; and it is this apparent falseness that defines TI, at 
least in this instance, as a delusion. Indeed, throughout his paper Young has consistently 
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referred to TI as ‘delusions of thought insertion’ and implies that the delusion is primary in 
nature (‘patients seem to require no external evidence, investigation or complex inference in 
order to arrive at them [the delusions]’). This conforms to the psychiatric definition of TI as a 
‘false belief that the subject receives inserted, alien thoughts’ (Mullins and Spence 2003).  
        Arguments about whether all delusions are beliefs aside, this definition could be divided 
into two components: the false belief and the inserted alien thoughts. Just by this medical 
definition alone, it is clear that the belief part has been dissociated from the actual inserted 
thoughts. So, if TI is indeed a delusion, to which of these two components does the delusion 
apply? It would seem obvious that the false belief about the inserted thoughts is the delusion. 
Some may argue that how could thoughts be inserted from the external (and also belong to 
someone else) in the first place? ‘Privileged access’ allows one to have direct, taken-for-
granted knowledge (a kind of knowledge which does not require external evidence) of one’s 
own thoughts which are obtained through introspection. Yet, thoughts derived from both 
introspection and the mere act of thinking are separated from the individual’s subjectivity in 
TI. This separation (some call it the ‘separability thesis’, see Gibbs 2000), I argue, is the 
experience of having seemingly external thoughts. The individual who has such an 
experience does not deny the fact that they are the one who has had external thoughts inserted 
into their mind; the individual simply denies the thoughts themselves are their own. Indeed, 
this would fit nicely with the author’s account about mispredication. However, does this 
always constitute a delusion? 
        I have recently proposed (Humpston and Broome 2015) that the experience of having 
external thoughts – whose externality is only accessible through the first-person perspective 
(which is again a paradox) – alone is insufficient for a delusional elaboration to form, and it is 
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the act of ascribing another agent to these thoughts that drives the individual to a delusional 
end-point of the phenomenon. I do not necessarily agree with the term ‘delusions of thought 
insertion’ but rather, I think it is more likely ‘delusions in thought insertion’. Certainly the 
difference of one proposition may sound like a deliberately difficult game of lexicon, but I 
would like to argue that it is an important distinction which highlights the duplex nature that 
‘completes’ the phenomenology of TI. In this sense, Young’s account about mispredication 
would only apply to the basic, generative experience of TI and the delusions in TI would in 
fact be susceptible to errors through misidentification because the subject has actually 
ascribed the wrong instantiator to some thoughts that are in their own mental space. For 
example, if someone has an inserted thought of ‘Kill God’ (to use a well-known case), the 
thought itself does not contain ‘I must kill God’ but the indexical ‘I’ comes as a given 
prerequisite of thinking. Therefore, when the patient ascribes this thought to ‘Chris’ (again to 
use the author’s example) they have wrongly identified the agent of such ascription. Without 
this process of ascription or judgement, the delusion would not form and neither would the 
immunity principle apply. 
        It is true that this distinction between thoughts and thinking may appear to be trapped in 
an infinite regress (‘believing a thought is a thought is a thought’, and so on). Nevertheless, I 
think it could be defended by a more detailed and precise analysis of the ‘agent’ in TI. The 
impression from Young’s paper is that he deals exclusively about the ‘judgement’ of agency 
(hence my emphasis at the beginning of this commentary) which to me is a second-order 
process involving the attribution of a causal agent to a particular set of thoughts. The sense of 
agency, on the other hand, would be much more pre-reflective and basic. Young writes that 
‘patients do seem to arrive at [my emphasis] their delusional thoughts through a distinctive, 
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first-person way of knowing’. What he does not detail is how the patients could obtain this 
knowledge through, say, privileged access yet engage in an attributional process of the 
(seemingly) same agent to an external body simultaneously. Of course, as mentioned 
previously, delusions in TI are primary in nature in Young’s account – one which 
overshadows the entirety of the experience – but to me the delusional elaboration is 
secondary for reasons discussed above. While patients may not require any ‘complex 
inference’ (but if all delusions are doxastic surely they would require some sort of reasoning 
to gain belief status?) to find an external agent, it seems that the ascription of thoughts to this 
particular agent (e.g. ‘Chris’) is a parallel and dissociable process from the kind of first-
person access that is endowed with immediacy and transparency. The agent of awareness has 
been detached from the agent of authorship and ownership when the patient ‘hands over’ 
their thoughts to someone else. In TI, the latter is severely impaired or absent whereas the 
former may still be relatively intact (certainly the patient is still consciously aware of any 
thought that is in their mind!). This may answer Young’s question of ‘why the patient is 
delusional in the first place’ – because the patient is not delusional at first when they 
experience the ‘inserted’ thoughts but becomes so when they arrive at the conclusion that they 
are thought by an external thinker. 
        I understand some might question how it is at all possible to have thoughts that are 
generated by someone else in one’s own mind; isn’t this somewhat too concrete and 
bordering on solipsism? Yet in my opinion such an orientation captures the exact experience 
of the patient’s way of thinking and indeed, even ‘normal’ ways of thinking can sometimes be 
viewed as solipsistic as they reflect the very nature of subjective reality created by the 
experiential field of each and every one of us, delusional or not. 
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        Agreeably, just as Young himself writes, there is something deeply mysterious about the 
phenomenon of TI no matter how much one attempts to explain it with whatever kind of 
theory. TI itself may not challenge the immunity principle as such, but it still threatens the 
continuity and integrity of the subjective existence of thinking and the thoughts that ensue. 
Due to the ‘lack of robustness of one’s own self-boundaries’, the psychotic individual is 
trapped in a perpetual cul-de-sac, a paradox that erodes their very being. At the same time, 
however, they still use the first person pronoun ‘I’ to describe their bizarre and often 
extremely distressing experiences. This ‘I’ is not be the same as the essential indexical ‘I’ in 
this context because there is simply no other replacement for ‘I’ of any kind. Patients use ‘I’ 
as a mere descriptor which lacks the everyday mineness and associated immediacy others 
take for granted. 
        I have also argued that self-boundaries are not all-or-none concepts, but in fact lie on a 
continuum between internality and externality (Humpston and Broome 2015) and are 
permeable for subjective thoughts and experiences to ‘diffuse’ across. Of course, one could 
very well argue that all externality in this case is in fact internality because how could 
thoughts occur without a thinker? The counterargument is that while thoughts do not occur 
without a thinker, they can still lose the status of having an original thinker after they have 
been thought, especially when the original thinker themselves (mis)attribute them to another 
agent. There are many potential reasons why the original thinker may (consciously or 
unconsciously) decide to do so, or it could even be an automatic process to expel thoughts 
that in one way or another threaten the stability of the individual’s subjectivity. However, this 
creates yet another paradox, because for such diffusion to occur the subjectivity must have 
been already fragmented so there would not be a stability to protect. Perhaps the sheer pain 
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and suffering caused by psychosis (with TI as a first-rank symptom) are the exact 
manifestation of these unresolvable paradoxes originating within one another. 
        In sum, Young’s compatibilist account of TI and the immunity principle is compelling, 
but might benefit from a more detailed re-analysis of the distinct types of thinking and 
agency of thought as well as a clearer definition of the prerequisites under which the 
argument stands. Here I have outlined some of the implications and theoretical considerations 
of TI which will undoubtedly remain a mystery. I agree with the author to not risk 
oversimplification in one’s pursuit of philosophical generality – perhaps accounts of TI can 
never be generalised anyway – but I think it is important to delineate to the best of one’s 
ability the manifold complexities of the puzzle that is TI. 
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